Flight to quality and bailouts : policy remarks and a literature review by Caballero, Ricardo J. & Kurlat, Pablo
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Department of Economics
Working Paper Series
Flight to Quality and Bailouts: Policy Remarks and
a Literature Review
Ricardo J. Caballero
Pablo Kurlat
Working Paper 08-21
October 9, 2008
RoomE52-251
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02142
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the
Social Science Research Network Paper Collection at
httsp ://ssm.com/abstract= 1 29745 6

Flight to Quality and Bailouts:
Policy Remarks and a Literature Review
Ricardo J. Caballero and Pablo Kurlat^
October 9, 2008
Abstract
Flight to quality episodes involve a combination of extreme risk- or uncertainty- aversion,
weal<nesses in the balance sheets of key financial intermediaries, and strategic or speculative behavior,
that increases credit spreads on all but the safest and most liquid assets. Unlike previous episodes, the
entire US financial system is currently at the center of the trouble, with no safe haven pockets, w/hich
may lead to greater real effects. The US government's credit is still impeccable, w/hich facilitates policies
in support of the financial system. Policy must take into account incentives for behavior during the crisis,
discouraging excessive prudence, w/hich sometimes implies relegating post-crisis moral hazard concerns
to a secondary role.
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Introduction
The term "flight to quality" is used to describe an environment where investors seek to sell
assets perceived as risky and purchase safe assets instead, leading to widening risk premia and severe
disruptions in credit and other financial markets. By all accounts, the U.S. is currently experiencing an
extremely severe episode of this kind.
Financial Markets in the U.S. are struggling with a chronic flight to quality problem since mid
2007 that has oscillated in intensity but with ever increasing peaks. By September 15'^ of this year, even
money market funds were perceived as "unsafe;" the ensuing flight to quality brought treasury rates
down to zero and triggered record setting spikes in gold and oil. Policymakers, realizing that time was
running out, reacted by announcing the largest financial "bailout" package in world history.
Relative to the rest of the world, the U.S. is significantly more resilient to flight to quality
episodes for at least three reasons: First, the U.S. as a whole is perceived as a "safe haven," and hence
while investors run from risk, the U.S. typically sees sustained and stabilizing net capital inflows toward
its safest assets. Second, the highly leveraged financial sector, and banks in particular, are net recipients
of funds in search of "quality." This good correlation between leverage and the direction of funds is a
key ingredient for financial stability, which is absent in many other financial systems around the world
where the banking sector is the first victim of financial panics. Third, and partly due to the first reason,
the US has a flexible economic policy framework.
However, one of the main reasons the current episode has become so severe is that this second
stabilizing mechanism has vanished. While deposits have followed the standard pattern, almost all other
forms of funding are leaving the financial system in herds. This process has dried up liquidity in key
financial markets and has strained banks' balance sheets from plummeting asset values and hard to-roll-
over liabilities. The system was simply not ready for such a dramatic turnaround in correlations,
triggering all manner of amplification mechanisms, ranging from endogenous tightening in margin
requirements to a sudden rise in Knightian uncertainty. The first purpose of this article is to survey the
empirical and theoretical literature describing these mechanisms.
The second purpose of this article is to discuss the policy implications of flight to quality
mechanisms. In brief terms, the general policy message that emerges from the existing literature is
rather obvious: When flight to quality is severe, predictable and reliable systemic bailouts and lender of
last resort facilities are highly desirable. This is particularly the case when government instruments are
sound and the first stabilizing mechanism mentioned above -the rise in foreign capital inflows toward
treasuries remains active, as the cost of capital to finance the intervention is brought down by the flight
to quality itself (i.e., there is sharp rise in demand for Treasury Bills and Bonds). The goal of policy at
these times is to transfer some of the government's liquidity, collateral and trust, to the distressed

domestic financial sector. Tiie last section of the paper summarizes some of these policy implications
and adds a few conjectures.
There is, however, a less "linear" way to present the policy results and conjectures that flow
from the existing theories, and from what these miss. This is by providing a critical description of some
of the common features of current bailout proposals. Given the nature of the meeting for which this
article is being prepared, we do this directly here. Most readers may wish to read only up to the end of
this introduction, while others may wish to continue and find in the rest of the paper a brief description
of some of the articles that provide the backbone (but not the entire skeleton) for much of what is said
here.
Most proposals, including the one just approved by Congress, have in common a few general
principles: First, they recognize the need to recapitalize the financial system and to improve the liquidity
of several key asset and insurance markets. Second, there is an agreement on the need to protect
taxpayers by giving the government a share of the upside as well. In fact, many of us think that almost
any reasonable intervention at this time is likely to yield a large excess return to the government. Third,
most see moral hazard as a reason to limit the extent of the intervention and, in particular, to punish
shareholders. Not doing so, the argument goes, would make future crises more likely as it would
encourage the financial sector to repeat the excesses that caused the crisis in the first place.
We share the first two "principles" but are less persuaded by the third one. The main problem of
the standard moral hazard view is its disregard for the incentive problems it generates within crises. In
real life, unlike in many of our models, crises are not an instant but a time period. This time dimension
creates ample opportunity for all types of of strategic decisions within a crisis. Distressed agents have to
decide when and if to let go of their assets, knowing that a miscalculation on the right timing can be very
costly. Speculators and strategic players have to decide when to reinforce a downward spiral, and when
to stabilize it. Governments have to decide how long to wait before intervening, fully aware that
delaying can be counterproductive, but that the political tempo may require that a full blown crisis
becomes observable for bickering to be put aside. Each of these agents is in the game of predicting what
others are likely to do. In particular, the likelihood of a bailout and the form it is expected to take change
the incentives for both distressed firms and speculators within the crisis. These incentives are central,
both to the resolution of the current crisis as well as for the severity of the next crises.
A standard advice stemming from the moral hazard camp is to subject shareholders to
exemplary punishnrient (the words used by Treasury Secretary Paulson during the Bear Stearns
intervention). This is sound advice in the absence of a time dimension within crises. With no time
dimension, all shareholders were part of the boom that preceded the crisis and as soon as the bailout
takes place the crisis is over; the next concern is not to repeat the excesses that led to the crisis.

Punishing shareholders means punishing those that led to the current crisis, and it is better that they
learn the lesson sooner rather than later.
However, this advice can backfire when we add back the time dimension. Now, the expectation
that shareholders will be exemplarily punished if the crisis worsens delays in the decision to inject much
needed capital by stabilizing investors. As a concrete example, sovereign wealth funds are now much
less eager to inject equity into the U.S. financial system than they once were. Conversely, destabilizing
speculators and shortsellers see the value of their strategy reinforced by the policy of exemplary
punishment. For both reasons, crises become more acute, as the equity market becomes extremely one-
sided when uncertainty and risk rise during bouts of panic and confusion. The anti-moral hazard strategy
turns into a crisis enzyme.
This theme also highlights an aspect that is being minimized in current proposals: the strategic
component. One of the puzzling behaviors during the current crisis is why so much informed capital has
remained on the side, despite obvious fire sales. For relatively small investors, or those constrained by
regulation on the size of their position, the fear of exemplary punishment should another bout of panic
take place may be the answer. However, for large investors,, who have the potential to gain control, the
most likely answer is predatory and strategic behavior. When uncertainty rises, markets become illiquid
and market power develops. In this context, the optimal strategy of the predators is to wait or pull out
resources from the target, waiting for a deeper crisis. In such a context, a potential bailout plays yet
another role, which is to increase the perception of competition and hence to reduce the predator's
incentive to wait for the full-blown crisis to unfold.
Of course, there is such as a thing as too much of a good thing, as the anticipation of a bailout
may increase the incentive to wait by the seller. If the anticipation turns out to be incorrect, this
reaction complicates the crisis resolution as it delays external capital injections until it may be too late.
The case of AIG and its refusal to accept an offer by J.C. Flowers the weekend before its demise is an
example often used to support this position. However, one should note that this is a problem caused by
the unpredictability of policy, not by the predictable component of this policy. If the government has
ample access to liquidity, and balance sheets are being destroyed by the reinforcing feedback of acute
mispricing and predatory actions, it is important that the private sector can count on this liquidity. That's
"good moral hazard," as it would ultimately be too costly for the private sector to hoard liquidity for
such episodes.
Along the same vein, when Knightian uncertainty is prevalent, the main problem is too little not
too much private risk taking. Within the crisis, markets are on the other side of risk taking relative to the
conventional moral hazard concern, and hence inducing a more aggressive use of private liquidity is a
positive rather than a negative development. That is, while it is true that excessive risk taking prior to

the crisis can be a source of trouble, once a crisis is reached, the greater concern is insufficient risk
taking and explicit public support can encourage rather than prevent desirable private sector behavior.
These concerns lead to several observations regarding how the details of the bailout, many of
which are yet to be determined, should be arranged. One objective must be to signal to signal the
strategic investors waiting in the sidelines that prices will stop falling and thus discourage speculative
waiting. Speculators will not expect that prices of securities will be lower than those established at the
Treasury's auction (if indeed an auction is used), at least in the period that immediately follows the
auction. Thus the date of the auction provides a clear deadline to any speculative waiting. Announcing a
timetable for purchasing a given list of securities may therefore have a salutary effect on prices even
before the actual purchases take place.
To the extent possible, the first securities to be purchased should be those where the evidence
of mispricing is greatest. For instance, certain AAA-rated tranches of subprime mortgage backed
securities have been trading at prices that are hard to justify except by the extreme illiquidity of the
market. If these securities were first on the Treasury's list, this would send a signal to speculators that
the possible gains from speculative waiting will soon disappear.
One risk is that if some of the holders of a particular security are especially distressed, this may
lead to fire-sale prices when the Treasury purchases the securities. To some extent, this risk is mitigated
by the profits the taxpayers would make on this purchase. Still, there is a concern that purchases at
excessively low prices would harm other security-holders, if nothing else, from having to mark-to-
market their remaining holdings. One way to partially avoid this situation is to commit to purchasing a
sufficiently large amount of each security to minimize the impact that any particular security-holder's
distress will have on auction prices.
Finally, the Treasury's plan contains as-yet-unclear provisions for giving the government an
equity stake in the companies it assists. Presumably this will involve diluting the holdings of current
shareholders. One way to take into account the within-crisis incentives this policy generates would be to
give special consideration (for instance, lower dilution) to firms that raised fresh capital since the start of
the crisis, and to those that experienced the most extreme predatory attacks which cannot be justified
on the grounds of fundamentals.
To be clear, our position is not that the standard moral hazard concerns should be disregarded.
Instead, our argument is that it is important that when designing policies to address it, we are more
mindful of the perverse incentives that they may trigger within crises. The "exemplary punishment"
approach is one example of a misguided policy along these lines, letting Lehman Brothers fail may have
been another one, but there are many post-crisis regulatory responses that could deal with moral
hazard without backfiring during the crisis.

Evidence
A defining feature of a flight to quality is a decrease in the relative dennand for risky assets.
Depending on the elasticity of supply, this may materialize as a fall in their relative price, in the quantity
supplied, or in both.^ For already-issued securities, which at least in the short run are in fixed supply, a
flight to quality show/s up as a change in relative prices. For newly issued securities or loans, quantities
may respond as well. Accordingly, different studies have focused on either quantities or prices when
exploring evidence on flights to quality.
Obviously there are more than two possible levels of riskiness ("risky" and "safe") and a flight to
quality may involve shifts in relative behavior toward any group or subgroup of assets. For instance, it
may involve a preference for bonds over stocks, for AAA bonds over junk bonds, for treasuries over
corporate bonds, or many of these at once. Different studies have looked at the evidence on the basis of
one or several of these pairings of assets.
Finding 1: The amount and composition of banl< loans reveal that flight to quality is countercyclical. This
pattern exacerbates the business cycle by depriving lower quality borrowers from financial resources
during contractions.
A series of early studies focused on quantities, examining how the composition of firms' external
financing varied with macroeconomic conditions. Kashyap, Stein, & Wilcox (1993) found that following
tightening of monetary policy there were systematic increases in the relative quantity of commercial
paper compared to bank lending. The underlying view is that large firms have access to a commercial
paper market whereas small firms are more dependent on bank lending, perhaps because bank
monitoring is essential to overcome informational asymmetries. Thus, a relative reduction in bank
lending can be interpreted as a flight to quality. Similarly, Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and Oliner and
Rudebusch (1993) found that the relative proportion of loans to large corporations increases in these
episodes, and Lang and Nakamura (1995) found that the fraction of new loans made at rates below
prime+1% (which they interpret as relatively safe) is countercyclical and rises after tightenings of
monetary policy. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) offer evidence consistent with these findings
using data from the Department of Commerce's Quarterly Financial Report of manufacturing firms,
which includes a greater proportion of small (manufacturing) firms. Furthermore, they compare the
fluctuations in the growth rates of sales, inventories, and debt in small and large firms and conclude that
as much as one third of aggregate fluctuations could be explained by the differences between small and
large firms. The broad conclusion of these studies is that financial constraints for lower-quality
^ The terms supply and demand are subject to some ambiguity. A decrease in investors' desires to acquire risky
claims is customarily described as a decrease in demand in the context of securities, and a decrease in supply in
the context of bank loans. This essay follows this customary use unless there is risk of confusion.
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borrowers tighten in periods of recession or tight money and that they have quantitatively important
real consequences.
Finding 2: During nnild flight to quality episodes, funds flow toward banks. However, banks' safe haven
status weakens for severe flights to quality, where only the safest assets experience Inflows.
Gatev and Strahan (2006) study the other side of banks' balance sheets. In data for 1988-2002,
they find that when the spread between Treasury bills and high grade commercial paper Increases,
banks (but not other financial intermediaries) tend to experience inflows of deposits and a decreased
cost of funding. This suggests that banks tend to be seen as safe havens in periods of turmoil. Gatev and
Strahan attribute this advantage to implicit government backing and suggest that this is one of the
reasons why banks are better placed than other institutions to offer liquidity insurance. At least in their
sample, flights to quality seem to have been flights toward banks rather than from banks.
The data for 1998, however, show a very small shift toward banks. Nontransactional deposits in
U.S. banks grew 2.5% in the second half of the year, whereas they had grown 5.2% in the first half.
Furthermore, although LIBOR and CD rates decreased, their spreads with respect to Treasury rates
widened substantially, as did other indicators of risk such as the VIX. Overall, the evidence suggests that
the flight to quality also involved a worsening in the relative position of banks compared to the very
safest assets. As the figures show, however, the episode was very short lived. By the end of the year
both spreads and the VIX were within a normal range.
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Figure 1. After the Russian default ttiere was a decrease in interest rates, including interest rates paid by
banks on CDs and LIBOR
Figure 2. The "TED spread" increased, as did tiie spread on high grade commercial paper and on long
term AAA bonds. There was some degree offlight to guality even within the safest assets. This lasted a
very short time.
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Figure 3. Other indicators of risl(, such as the VIX, increased sharply but briefly.
Finding 3: Both stock market crashes and large reallocation offunds towards bonds are rare, but each
increases the likelihood of the other. The US bond market also serves as a safe haven for international
equity market crashes.
Both Bemanke et. al. and Gatev and Strahan study long data series that include mostly "normal"
times and use the expression "flight to quality" in studies of systematic, but not necessarily large, shifts
in the availability of financing for different kinds of firms. It is not clear, however, that the phenomenon
they describe constitutes a flight to quality in the same sense that observers of the current financial
environment use. Other studies, looking at prices rather than quantities, have focused on a definition
that explicitly refers to more extreme events. Hartmann, Straetmans, and de Vries (2004) study whether
crashes in stock and bond markets in G5 countries (between 1987 and 1999) tend to occur
simultaneously or instead tend to follow a flight to quality pattern, with stock market crashes
accompanied by bond market booms. They define a crash as an episode where there is a weekly drop of
more than 20% in stock prices (estimated to occur once every 39 years) or a drop of more than 8% in
bond prices (estimated to occur once every 30 years). They find evidence of strengthened linkages
between different markets at these extreme values, but these are approximately just as likely to go in

either direction, i.e. co-crashes are approximately as frequent as flights to quality. Flight to quality is
especially likely toward the US bond market: it is estimated that 4.6% of US, 7.9% of German, 7.7% of
French, 8.3% of UK, and 3.0% of Japanese stock market crashes will coincide with a boom in US bond
markets. The likelihood of stock market crashes coinciding with non-US bond market booms is much
lower, reflecting the greater perceived safety and liquidity of US bonds. Gonzalo and Olmo (2005) find a
similar negative association between stock returns and bond returns during periods of distress, but only
for short term bonds. Baur and Lucey (2008) find evidence that during crises periods (defined by
identifiable events) the correlation between stock and bond markets becomes stronger and negative,
and this was especially the case in the Asian crisis of 1997 and the Russian crisis of 1998. They interpret
this as evidence of a flight to quality effect. Overall, this literature tends to confirm the view that in
periods of uncertainty or distress or bad news there is often a flight from risky assets like stocks to less
risky assets like bonds.
It is worth emphasizing that, unlike the typical emerging markets experience, in the U.S. flights
to quality have not generally been accompanied by generalized capital flights, indeed, it is usually the
case that non-residents are net purchasers of government bonds in flights to quality. In the flight to
quality that accompanied the stock market crash of 1987, net foreign inflows into US government bonds
increased from 0.16% to 0.22% of US GDP; in the brief flight to quality before the Gulf war in 1990, they
increased from 0.31% to 0.38%, and in 1998 from 0.06% to 0.15%^
Finding 4: Flight to quality is perceptible even across nearly equivalent assets.
Stocks and bonds are coarse categories of assets and there is a limit to what can be learned by
studying asset prices at that level of aggregation. Several studies have studied the behavior of more
narrowly defined assets in order to determine exactly what happens during flights to quality. Longstaff
(2004) studied the spreads between bonds issued by Refcorp and comparable US Treasury bonds.
Refcorp is a US government agency whose liabilities are guaranteed by the Treasury, so legally the credit
risk in its liabilities is identical to that in Treasury bonds. Nevertheless, the yield on Refcorp bonds was,
on average between 1991 and 2001, between 10 and 16 basis points higher than on Treasury bonds
(depending on maturity). This difference accounted for as much as 10% to 15% of the value of
Treasuries. Longstaff labels this spread a flight-to-liquidity premium. He then regresses this premium on
a series of time-varying measures of investor sentiment. He finds that increases in the premium are
associated with (a) drops in consumer confidence, (b) increases in the amount of funds held in money-
market mutual funds (since these are one of the safer asset classes, an inflow of funds presumably
^ The comparisons are are the last 3 quarters of 1987 against the previous 3 quarters; the last quarter of 1990
against the third quarter and 2"" half of 1998 against the l" half respectively, in all cases seasonally adjusted.

indicates a flight to quality") and (c) Treasury buy-backs (since these make Treasury bonds more scarce,
their premium tends to increase). Krishnamurthy (2002) finds similar results when comparing the yields
on on-the-run and off-the-run Treasury bonds. He finds that higher spreads on off-the-run bonds are
associated with higher spreads between commercial paper and Treasuries.
Finding 5: The relative importance of liquidity over credit quality rises during flight to quality episodes.
In both of these studies the authors identify premia that increase in times of distress but do not seem to
be associated with credit quality but rather with liquidity. Of course, credit quality and liquidity are
closely related and hence it is hard to determine exactly what it is that investors seek. Beber, Brandt,
and Kavajecz (2008) address this question by taking advantage of the fact that the credit quality and
liquidity of bonds from different Euro-area countries have a slight negative correlation.^ They have
direct measures of the credit quality of different countries from spreads on credit default swaps and
construct measures of liquidity on the basis of data on bid-ask spreads and the depth of limit order
books. They find that both credit quality and liquidity are significant determinants of bond yields. In
normal times, credit quality plays a greater role; however, at times of uncertainty (as measured by the
VSTOXX options index), or when there are flights into or out of the bond market (as measured by net
order flows), the importance of liquidity for explaining the cross-sectional variation of yields increases.
Overall, the evidence from these studies suggests that at times of uncertainty, investors place a
premium on assets that are not just safe but have very low transaction costs.
Finding 6: The macroeconomic cost of recent flight to quality episodes in the U.S. has been limited,
although this may well be the result of aggressive and successful policy responses.
Asset pricing evidence indicates that from investors' point of view the possibility of flights to
quality is a real concern. From a policy point of view the more important concern is to what extent these
episodes lead to consequences in the real economy. On this point the evidence is tentative at best, in
part due to the difficulty in defining what constitutes a flight to quality. Conceivably, a flight to quality
may be associated with either a drop in aggregate investment or a redirection of investment toward less
risky projects or toward firms with more solid balance sheets. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996)
and related studies contain suggestive evidence in this direction, but the magnitude of the efficiency
losses due to misallocated investment cannot be ascertained.
In the turmoil that followed the Russian default and the collapse of LTCM in the summer of
1998, the U.S. economy did not seem to suffer greatly. Real GDP grew at an annualized rate of 3.6% in
This statement may have become outdated since Longstaff' s paper was written.
' For instance, I
credit qualities.
^ talian bonds are among the most liquid in Europe despite the fact that Italy has one of the lowest
'.'<:
'
the first half of 1998 and 5.4% in the second half, investment at 7.2% and 9.8% respectively. This
resilience, however, may be due to the relative brevity of the scare. As shown in Figure 2, spreads were
back within a normal range by the end of the year after a sharp spike in September. Furthermore, banks
increased their volume of loans by 5.0% in the second half of the year (compared to 3.9% in the first
half), which partly compensated the decrease in issues of corporate debt and preserved the flow of
credit to the real economy. The Fed's aggressive easing of monetary policy (the target rate was lowered
by 75 basis points to 4.75% in the second half of 1998) may also have played a role. Finally, the safe
haven status of the U.S. as a whole further lowered the cost of capital.
What do these findings tell us about the severity and nature of the current crisis ?
The current episode has many of the features of previous flights to quality. Firstly, there have
been sharp and opposite movements of bond and stock markets. The S&P 500 index was 27% lower
than in June 2007, while the Lehman Brothers Aggregate bond index was more than 10% higher. This is
the kind of co-movement studied by Hartmann et. al. (2004), albeit at a lower frequency. In keeping
with the pattern of previous episodes (in particular 1998), investors' flight to safe assets (plus the Fed's
monetary policy) has led to sharp drops in yields.
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Figure 4. Safe interest rates have gone down since the beginning of the current turmoil in the summer of
2007, as they did in 1998.
The flight to quality is evident even within traditionally very safe asset classes. This feature was
also noted in previous episodes but its magnitude and persistence is far greater this time. LIBOR spreads
over Treasuries have been between 100 and 200 basis points for most of the past year, reaching peal<s
of 280 basis points in September. In 1998 the peak spread was approximately 160 basis points and even
that only lasted a few days. The force of the flight from banks is proving stronger than the force of the
flight towards banks. This may yet translate into the real economy in a way that was not seen in 1998,
especially if the credit channels identified by Bernanke et. al. (1996) react strongly.
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Figure 5. Spreads between Treasuries yields and other safe assets have remained persistently high for
over a year.
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The VIX index, which was at comparatively low levels at the beginning of 2007, has increased
more than threefold since then. It has not reached the peak levels of 1998 but the increase has been
much more persistent, evidence of a lasting pullout from volatility.
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Figure 6. The VIX index has also remained high for over a year.
Theory
A number of authors have attributed the existence of flights to quality to various institutional
features of financial markets, which lead to feedback effects between asset prices and investors'
preference for liquidity.
Proposition 1: When asset price volatility rises, illiquidity risk rises and this feeds back into an increase in
effective risk aversion.
Vayanos (2004) presents a model that may explain why both risk and illiquidity premia may
increase in times of market volatility, which are precisely the features of a flight to quality. In the model,
there is one safe asset and many risky assets. The volatility of the risky assets is itself an exogenous
stochastic process. The risky assets are illiquid in that each carries a different (exogenous and constant)
transaction cost. Investors are assumed to be fund managers whose incentives are governed by the
management fee they are paid. This is proportional to assets under management or, if the fund is
liquidated, to the liquidation value of the fund (the fund will be liquidated if performance falls below a
fixed threshold, as clients withdraw their money). When market volatility is low, managers are not very

concerned with withdrawals and therefore do not care about each asset's transaction cost. However,
when the volatility of the market is high, the probability that the fund's performance falls below the
threshold increases. This brings two effects. First, managers place greater weight on the liquidation
value of each asset, so illiquidity premia increase. Secondly, each risky asset's contribution to the
likelihood of the fund's liquidation increases, so effective risk aversion increases and risk premia
increase.
Proposition 2: Agency problems limit the amount of risk uninformed investors can bear, which means
specialists' capital is pro-cyclical and hence triggers flight to quality during severe contractions.
Building on Holmstrom and Tirole's (1997) analysis of the role of intermediary capital in
connecting uninformed investors to projects. He and Krishnamurthy (2008) study a model related to
that of Vayanos. While the latter takes the fact that that poorly performing fund managers will face
withdrawals as a given feature of the environment, they instead model the relationship between
investment managers and investors explicitly. In their model, investment in a risky asset requires specific
skills provided by a specialist. Both specialists and uninformed investors contribute capital to an
intermediary institution (such as a bank) and write contracts that govern how much each party receives
as a function of the return on the investment portfolio, which is managed by the specialist. There are
two limits to what the investors can get the specialist to do on their behalf. First, the specialist may fail
to exert effort, which lowers expected returns. To motivate effort, investors must make the payment to
specialists a function of realized returns. Second, investors cannot monitor the portfolio composition
chosen by the specialist (i.e. what fraction is invested in the risky asset). Hence the specialist will choose
a portfolio balance that optimizes his own desired exposure to market risk. These two forces place an
upper bound on the proportion of aggregate risk that non-specialist investors can bear: If they wish to
increase their exposure to risk they must persuade the specialist to increase the riskiness of the portfolio
by reducing sensitivity of his payments to realized returns; however, the need to prevent the specialist
from shirking places a limit on how much they can do this. Therefore the equilibrium price of risk will be
such that specialists are willing to bear this minimum proportion; since risk aversion is decreasing in
wealth there will be a negative relation between specialists' capital and the price of risky assets. Thus
the model offers a rationale as to why effective risk aversion (and therefore risk premia) increases in
periods where intermediary institutions have suffered losses. In common with Vayanos (2004), this
theory focuses on how delegation of investment management may create flight to quality patterns in
asset prices at times of distress. By modeling the structure of the agency relationship explicitly. He and
Krishnamurthy highlight the role of specialists' capital.
Proposition 3: The tightening of margin requirements during periods of high price volatility reinforces
flight to quality, as funds are reallocatedfrom more to less volatile assets.

Krishnamurthy (2008) explores a slightly different channel by which intermediaries' capital may
play a role in flights to quality. In his model there are two layers of intermediation. The first intermediary
(perhaps a bank) issues a claim at an Initial date and commits to repurchase it from investors using its
(limited) liquid funds. If few investors request repurchasing, the bank's liquid funds are sufficient and it
pays a fair price; if instead many ask for repurchasing, the price is governed by the amount of liquid
funds of the bank. Investors in the bank are the second intermediaries (perhaps hedge funds) and they
are subject to margin constraints that limit their investment in the asset to a fixed multiple of their
equity. The feedback mechanism works as follows: Since hedge funds are leveraged, a decrease in the
price of the asset will necessitate a decrease in their holdings to meet margin constraints. Thus they will
try to resell the asset to the bank. Since the bank has limited funds, this will lower the equilibrium price
of the asset even further. The model has some of the features of models of bank runs like Diamond and
Dybvig (1983), such as the possibility of multiple equilibria due to coordination failure. The difference is
that the inefficient equilibrium here is not triggered by fear of what others are doing but by institutional
features, in particular margin requirements that work through market prices. Margin requirements play
a similar role in the model by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008). In it, speculators buy and sell risky
assets, smoothing temporary imbalances in supply and demand and thus providing liquidity to asset
markets (i.e. keeping prices close to fundamental values). Speculators have limited capital and borrow
from financiers who set margin constraints to control their own value at risk. Crucially, financiers do not
know the fundamental value of the assets and therefore may misinterpret price deviations from
fundamentals (which would lead to arbitrage opportunities for speculators and thus reduce risk) as an
increase in overall riskiness and thus increase margin requirements. This may lead to liquidity spirals as
rising margins means that speculators cannot provide as much liquidity and prices deviate more from
fundamentals. Furthermore, this implies that flights to quality will occur since the assets that are least
volatile will be subject to lower margin requirements, and therefore their prices will be closer to
fundamentals at times of illiquidity.
Proposition 4: When marl<ets are relatively new, they are subject to Knightian uncertainty. This
uncertainty has the potential to explain the extreme withdrawal fron) risk-sharing during severe flight to
quality episodes.
A second class of models of flights to quality is based on a distinction between risk and
"Knightian" uncertainty. In certain circumstances, the argument goes, market participants lack the
information or experience to make precise probabilistic judgments about future events. Instead, they
may resort to decision rules that seek to optimize worst-case-scenario outcomes, with possibly
destabilizing aggregate consequences. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) model how this form of
behavior affects flights to quality. They study an economy where identical agents have an endowment of
cash and have to decide when to consume it. The economy may be hit by liquidity shocks, whereby

some agents have a sudden need for cash. Conditional on a first (aggregate) liquidity shock, there is a
probability that a second shock, affecting the agents spared by the first shock, also takes place. Agents
write insurance contracts that dictate transfers of cash to one another in the event of one of thenn is hit
by either a first shock or a second shock. The efficient allocation is such that agents are more insured
against being hit by the first shock than against being hit by the second, simply because this is a more
likely event. If agents knew the probabilities of being hit be either shock, this is the allocation a free
market in insurance would produce. By assumption, however, agents know aggregate probabilities of
shocks but have Knightian uncertainty about whether they will be in the first or second wave. Thus in a
free insurance market they seek to insure themselves against the worst possible outcome, which is
being hit in the second wave, and are not willing to commit enough of their capital to insuring those hit
by the first wave. There is thus an inefficient flight to quality: Out of fear of being part of a second wave
of shocks, agents prefer to hoard the safest asset (cash) instead of offering insurance contracts against
first wave shock, which as a result, they are underinsured against. Put differently, private liquidity
freezes too soon.
Brock and Manski (2008) also study the role of Knightian uncertainty in a model of a market for
risky loans. Lenders must decide what fraction of their assets to allocate to loans and what fraction to a
safe asset. At some point there is an unexpected shock that lenders do not know how to interpret. Three
possible decision rules following the shock are considered: a standard one where lenders place
subjective probabilities on the possibility of repayment; one where they seek to maximize their payoffs
under the worst possible repayment scenario (maxmin), and one where they minimize the maximum
possible regret from their decision (minmax-regret). In calibrated numerical examples, they show that
the flight to quality effect (increases in contractual interest rates on loans and decreases in the
equilibrium amount of loans) can be greater under the maxmin or minmax-regret criteria.
A question left open by theories that appeal to Knightian uncertainty to explain flights to quality
is what exactly triggers robust or max-min decision making by investors in response to aggregate
liquidity shocks. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) argue that unfamiliar contexts, often related to
recent financial innovation, are prone to this kind of behavior. As an example, they contrast the market's
reaction to the demise of LTCM in 1998 to its reaction to the losses suffered by Amaranth in 2006. In the
same line, Krischnamurthy (2008) contrasts the reaction of commercial paper investors to Penn
Central's default in 1970 to their reaction to Mercury Finance's default in 1997. In each case the
argument is that market participants' increased familiarity, with the operations of hedge funds and with
commercial paper respectively, accounts for the calm with which the latter event was received.
Evidence on the overall relevance of Knightian uncertainty in financial markets is provided by Liu, Pan,
and Wang (2005). They find that a model allowing for uncertainty aversion fits the evidence on option
prices far better than one with pure risk aversion. In particular, it accounts for the premium on far-out-
of-the-money put options.

Proposition 5: When markets turn illiquid and important players become constrained, pricing power
develops and this leads to strategic illiquidity exacerbation.
One important feature of the Knightian uncertainty nnodel of Caballero and Krishnamurty (2008)
is that market participants fail to pool their liquid assets efficiently, hoarding them in fear of worst-case
scenarios instead of insuring each other against intermediately-bad shocks. Acharya, Gromb, and
Yorulmazer (2008) provide an alternative explanation for the failure of private coinsurance in the
specific context of the interbank loan market, stemming from liquid banks exercising monopoly power
over banks that have liquidity needs. They model a bank (bank A) which needs cash and may obtain it in
either of two ways. One is by borrowing from a liquid bank (bank B); there is a limit to this because A
must retain a large enough stake in its asset portfolio to have incentives to engage in costly monitoring
of its assets. Alternatively, bank A may simply sell some of its assets to bank B; by assumption, this can
raise more cash since A does not need to retain a stake; however, the assets have varying degrees of
specificity and B cannot obtain as much value from them as A would. Under perfect competition,
interbank borrowing would always be the preferred option and asset sales would only be used if the
maximum cash that can be raised by borrowing were insufficient to meet A's cash needs, if instead B has
some degree of monopoly power, the only way to transfer value from A to B is through inefficient asset
sales. The mechanism in the paper resembles a flight to quality in that banks hoard liquidity rather than
lend to each other. However, they do so for opportunistic and strategic rather than precautionary
reasons. One of the reasons for the current high rates observed in the interbank loan market may be
that they are not being set competitively as liquid banks speculate with the possibility of purchasing
assets at distress prices.
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) also explore strategic considerations and show how they
may lead to "predatory trading" during a flight to quality. They model a situation where it becomes
known (to a limited number of speculators) that a trader needs to liquidate his position in some asset.
The market for this asset is not perfectly liquid, meaning that the distressed trader's sales will have an
impact on the price. The optimal reaction by the informed speculators is to trade in the same direction
as the distressed trader as fast as possible (attempting to "front run"), driving down the price of the
asset in order to profit from buying it back at a lower price later. Furthermore, margin constraints may
exacerbate the problem. If speculators know that a given trader will become distressed and need to sell
if his wealth falls below a given threshold, they may try to provoke this by selling to drive down the
price, forcing the trader into distress and profiting from buying back later. This may explain why in a
flight to quality, the prices of some risky illiquid assets may fall more sharply than one would expect
based on risk considerations alone.
The various theories of flights to quality suggest several mechanisms that can be at play in these
episodes. While the specifics are different, some common themes emerge. In particular, a common
element in all the theories is an actual or feared weakness in the balance sheet of some market

participants, who by eitiier tlieir specialized sl<ill or information play a key role in the determination of
asset prices, risk premia, or the allocation of funds. This observation informs many of the policy
recommendations that the theories have inspired.
Policy
Walter Bagehot famously argued in 1873 that in a panic "the holders of the cash reserve must
be ready not only to keep it for their ow/n liabilities, but to advance it most freely for the liabilities of
others. They must lend to merchants, to minor bankers, to 'this man and that man,' w/henever the
security is good." What do modern theories have to add to or subtract from this recommendation?
Principle 1: A l<ey aspect of intervention is to "issue a guarantee" to tlie private sector tliat extreme flight
to quality events will be acted upon aggressively, even if the government has less information than the
private sector about asset values .
The implications of the models discussed above are in clear agreem.ent with Bagehot's
recommendations. In Krishnamurthy's (2008) model, a loan to intermediaries would enable them to
honor their promise to purchase assets at a fair price, eliminating the equilibrium with mis-coordination
and depressed prices. A similar effect can be achieved by public purchases of illiquid assets. A central
bank acting as either a lender or a market maker of last resort would prevent the fire sales in the same
way that it would prevent bank runs. Similarly, Brock, and Manski (2008) argue that the government
could allay the fears that lead investors to act in max-min fashion by guaranteeing a minimum return on
(at least certain kinds of) investment. A difficulty with this last approach is that it assumes that the
government is not subject to the kind of uncertainty faced by the private sector. In practice, determining
when private investors are being excessively prudent is not to ascertain..
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) consider a form of intervention that can be useful even If
the government is not better informed than the private sector. In their model, the inefficiency arises
because agents, fearful of being hit by a second liquidity shock, are excessively unwilling to insure each
other against a first shock and prefer to hoard liquidity rather than pool it. They show that the optimal
form of intervention is to provide insurance against a second wave of shocks, which persuades private
agents to insure each other against a first shock. By acting as a lender of truly last resort, the central
bank may help overcome private banks' reluctance to act as each other's lenders of "intermediate
resort." A practical difficulty with implementing this policy is how to distinguish intermediately severe
crisis that the private sector should be encouraged to deal with on its own with true catastrophes that
warrant intervention.

Principle 2: Conventional moral hazard concerns are important for regulatory purposes but less so for
interventions during crises.
A major concern, known in the days of Bagehot and studied extensively since, is the issue of
moral hazard. If financial firms expect to receive emergency financing should they require it, they have
an incentive to take on excessive risk. This risk may take the form of excessive leverage or, more subtly,
of excess investment in illiquid assets. Due to arbitrageurs' limited resources, each firm that has to sell
illiquid assets depresses prices for everyone else, but does not take this effect into account in its
decision making. This concern is one of the rationales for the prudential regulation of financial
institutions. The current crisis has highlighted that these externalities can be created by institutions
other than commercial banks, such as hedge funds. Given their prominent role in supplying liquidity to
many asset markets, there may be a case for subjecting them to the kinds of prudential regulations that
are imposed on banks, such as limits on leverage and minimum liquidity requirements. Krishnamurthy
(2008) argues in this direction, cautioning however that these regulations will necessarily be a blunt tool
and may distort decisions in the (usual) non-crisis states of the world.
Referring back back to Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008), when Knightian uncertainty is
prevalent, the main problem is too little not too much private risk taking, and hence inducing a more
aggressive use of private liquidity is a positive rather than a negative development. Their model
highlights an important policy concern. While it is true that excessive risk taking prior to the crisis can be
a source of trouble, once a crisis is reached, the greater concern is insufficient risk taking and public
support can encourage rather than prevent desirable private sector behavior.
Principle 3: In the presence of speculative and predatory behavior, there is space for a wide range of
intervention tools, including equity support and shortselling constraints.
If the worry is about opportunistic or speculative behavior, several possible policies may be in
order. Acharya, Gromb, and Yorulmazer (2008) point out that if monopolistic behavior by liquid banks is
what prevents the smooth functioning of interbank markets, a central bank that stood willing to make
loans to troubled banks could improve their outside option in bargaining, leading to less inefficient asset
sales without the need to ever disburse emergency loans. If instead the concern is about front running
by predatory traders, as in Brunnermeier and Pedersen's (2005) model, unorthodox measures like
trading halts or limits on shortselling may prove useful. The share price responses to recently announced
restrictions on shortselling give some support to this idea. Interestingly, when shortselling of several
financial institutions was restricted last July, the share prices of other financial institutions not included
in the list reacted similarly to those that were included. This is probably partly due to the fact that the

shortselling constraints were aimed at stabilizing the core of the financial system, which maximizes
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Figure 7. Restrictions on short-selling sliares in certain financial firms were announced on July 15 and
were in place until August 12. The initial announcement was met by a sharp increase in share prices, but
for the companies included in the restricted list and for otherfinancial companies (the graph shows the
averages of the companies incuded in the ban and that of the five largest financial companies not
included in the ban). The reintroduction of a wider ban on September 19 was also accompanied by a
sharp rise.
We close with a brief discussion of important implementation issues which are not well covered
by existing theories but rather by only occasional hints.
Conjecture 1: The "political tempo" of intervention is significantly slower than that implied by the models
without politicians. This negotiated delay exacerbates uncertainty and flight to quality.
^ See also Caballero (1999) for a discussion of the value of equity market interventions in the context of Hong
Kong's stock market intervention to fight a speculative attack during the Asian crisis in the late 1990s.

The models assume that the conditions under which the government would intervene can be
precisely formulated ex-ante and are well understood by market participants. In practice, decisions are
taken by a political process that is subject to disputes about how the costs and benefits of intervention
are to be allocated among distressed firms, other market participants, and taxpayers. The process is
therefore subject to both delays and uncertainty about outcomes. This may make it harder to defuse a
flight to quality since measures that could be sufficient if they were promptly and credibly announced
might not calm investors' fears if they do not know when, whether, or how they will be implemented.
An important quality of any intervention policy is the promptness and predictability of its political
implementation process.
Conjecture 2: Agents learn within a crisis, which raises the intervention threshold as time goes by.
Unfamiliar conditions, financial instruments, or events are particularly susceptible to flights to
quality. However, what is unfamiliar at the beginning of a crisis may rapidly become familiar. Many
market participants were caught unaware by the collapse of Bear Sterns, whereas the collapse of
Lehman Brothers was more widely anticipated. If market participants understand the situation
progressively better, their assessment of risks should become more firmly grounded and their reliance
on worst-case scenarios diminished. If this is so, then private co-insurance should gradually take
precedence over public insurance, and the threshold for intervention should become increasingly
demanding.
Conjecture 3: Conventional lender of last resort interventions are insufficient once capital constraints
become binding.
A lender of last resort is useful when availability of cash is the binding constraint that prevents
financial institutions from either meeting their obligations or extending credit, as may be the case with a
firm facing a run. If instead the binding constraint is that insufficient capital prevents financial
institutions from taking on risk, then traditional lending of last resort will not be able to relax this. The
main usefulness of lending of last resort in this context is to reduce one particular source of risk, the risk
of a traditional bank run. To the extent that this is not the main risk that investors are worried about,
this form of intervention is of limited usefulness.
Conjecture 4: Whether intervention should be done through asset buybacl<s or direct equity injections
depends on which market is experiencing the largest distortions.
Intervention should be designed to achieve the greatest possible impact per dollar. If there is
confidence that certain assets held by financial institutions are significantly undervalued, then limited
asset buybacks can (i) sustain asset prices, allowing financial institutions to escape the rigors of mark-to-
ri',' 1,;
market accounting at fire-sale prices; (ii) deliver a profit to (or linnit the losses of) financial institutions,
an indirect way of recapitalizing them; and (iii) ensure a profit for taxpayers. This, however, is only
possible in the cases of securities that are significantly undervalued, which creates a sufficiently large
wedge between current valuations and fair prices to allow for profits for both the seller and the
taxpayer. The behavior of liquidity premia during flights to quality suggests that this may be the case for
the most illiquid securities, including new and untried ones.
Assessing fair values of illiquid securities is a considerable practical challenge. If it is hard to
identify obviously undervalued assets, direct equity injections are a more straightforward approach. This
policy simultaneously capitalizes financial institutions and most likely yields a high return to taxpayers
(see, e.g., Caballero 1999).
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